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DIGITAL SAMPLING AND THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS USE AFTER
BRIDGEPORT
AMANDA WEBBER*
INTRODUCTION
The increase in digital sampling has been greatly attributed to
the hip hop industry,1 one of the most influential and popular
genres of music in the world today.2 "Old recordings are to the
hip-hop producer what paint is to the painter-raw material to
be manipulated into art."3 Today's "studio musicians" are able to
manipulate and add effects to previously recorded music,
creating an infinite amount of new and innovative sounds
without fear of ruining the sound quality.4 However, to the world
outside of the hip hop industry, music that utilizes digital
* J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Public Relations,
Minor in Business, Pennsylvania State University at University Park, December 2003.
1 See Susan Butler, Court Ruling Could Chill Sample Use, BILLBOARD, September 18,
2004. According to the Roots' co-manager Shawn Gee, "[s]ampling is so important. It's the
foundation of rap and hip hop." RIAA, 2004 CONSUMER PROFILE (2004),
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdfI2004yearEndStats.pdf. The 2004 RIAA
Consumer Profile shows the Rap/Hip hop genre as second only to the Rock category in
total percentage of market sales.
2 See Susan Berfield, The CEO of Hip Hop, Bus. WK., October 27, 2003, at 90
('Marketing experts estimate one-quarter of all discretionary spending in America today
is influenced by hip-hop."); see also Kevin Chappell, 30 Years of Hip Hop Music, EBONY,
June 2005, at 52 (describing the $4 billion-a-year hip hop industry as an artistic
phenomenon with an undeniable influence).
3 JOSEPH G. SCHLOSS, MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF SAMPLE-BASED HIP-HOP 23
(George Lipsitz, Susan McClary, & Robert Walser eds., Wesleyan University Press 2004)
(quoting "Mr. Supreme," a consultant in the industry).
4 See A. Dean Johnson, Music Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use
Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 135, 139-40 (1993)
(noting sampling to create greater opportunities to manipulate sounds and provide a
musician access to an entire orchestra with only minimal investment); Howard Reich,
Send in the Clones The Brave New Art of Stealing Musical Sounds, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15,
1987, at 8C ("The sampler's greatest wonder ... is the ease with which it can clone any
sound it has recorded.").
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sampling has been written off as stealing. 5 The Copyright Act of
1976 was created to protect existing works without stifling
further creativity. 6 The addition of the Sound Recording Act
created a statutory right of protection in the actual fixed
recording of a particular "musical composition." 7 Because neither
the Copyright Act nor the Sound Recording Act was written with
digital sampling in mind, courts have varied in how they choose
to apply the various sections of the Acts, and how they interpret
the overall purpose of copyright laws in the digital sampling
context.8 In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,9 the
Sixth Circuit created a bright-line rule making any sampling of a
sound recording per se infringement. 10 The court's message, "[g]et
a license or do not sample,"11 may have drastically changed the
landscape of popular music in the future.12
5 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 1 (highlighting the belief that sample-based hip hop is
neither music nor art, as the sounds are taken rather than created); see also K.J. Greene,
Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 339, 381 n.197 (1999) (noting that while hip hop has been criticized the most for
its heavy reliance on music sampling, other popular musical genres, rock in particular,
have also used this practice); Reich, supra note 4, at 8C (purporting the digital sampler to
be "creating an army of thieves"). See, e.g., David Zimmerman, Rap's Crazy Quilt of
"Sampled" Hits, USA TODAY, July 31, 1989, at 4D ("Sampling has edged into rock-U2,
Peter Gabriel and Iggy Pop are practitioners.").
6 See The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2005); see also Copyright Law
Revision: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the Comm. of the Judiciary on H.R. 223, 94th Cong. 475-79
(1975) (testimony of Donald D. Merry, President, Sicom Electronics Corp.) (describing
incentives given by copyright protection and balancing the creation of incentives with
exclusivity).
7 17 U.S.C.§ 114 (2005).
8 See Bryan Bergman, Into the Grey: The Unclear Laws of Digital Sampling, 27
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 619, 644 (2005) (explaining that "sampling was not a
common practice when Congress created the 1976 version of the Copyright Act"); see also
Carl A. Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 359, 360 n.5 (1994) (noting that one of the first music sampling machines available
was introduced in 1979 at a price of $28,000 and the first relatively inexpensive sampler
under $1,700 appeared in 1985).
9 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
10 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter Bridgeport II] (stating "get a license or do not sample").
11 Id. at 801.
12 See Matthew R. Brodin, Comment, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimensions Films: The
Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in Digital Sampling Copyright Infringement
Claims-The Sixth Circuit's Flawed Attempt at a Bright-Line Rule, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. &
TECH. 825, 826 (2005) ('The hip-hop industry is worried that [the Bridgeport decision] will
negatively impact creativity by significantly limiting the amount of music that artists can
legally sample."). See, e.g., Eric Olsen, 3 Notes and Runnin." Sample Ruling Protest,
BLOGCRITICS.ORG (Sept. 15, 2004), http:/Iblogcritics.org/archives/
2004/09/15/200145.php (calling the ruling a "disaster").
DIGITAL SAMPL[NG
This paper will focus on: digital sampling13 and its positive
impact on music; the chilling effects that will occur in both
creative output by artists and economic input for the music
industry if owners of sound recording copyrights are given
absolute monopoly power over their works; and finally, the
possible alternatives to the concerns behind digital sampling.
These alternatives include a recommendation that Congress
enact new laws specifically dealing with digital sampling as its
own independent art form by creating a subgenre of fair use
analysis in determining to what extent sampling constitutes
infringement, along with a compulsory licensing system within
the music industry.
I. DIGITAL SAMPLING IN HIP Hop, DIGITAL SAMPLING IS HIP HOP
Before delving into any kind of legal analysis, it is important to
understand the history behind the practice of digital sampling-
not only where it originated, but why. It is easy for many to
draw the oversimplified conclusion that sampling is stealing and
has no artistic value.' 4 However, by learning about the close
historical and social relationship between disc jockeying
(manipulation of turntables in live performance) and producing
(the use of digital sampling in the studio), digital sampling can
be re-cast as a true art form, worthy of as much protection as any
other creative work.15
13 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 5. There are different kinds of sampling. The type of
sampling discussed in this Comment is the sampling of sounds from commercially
released records or compact discs, ranging from one note to entire segments of previously
recorded songs. Hip hop music has also branched out and there are hip hop producers who
do not use sampling. However, any distinction between sample-based and non-sample-
based hip hop is a distinction of genre, rather than one of individual technique. Many hip
hop purists who sample place great importance on that fact, and find it difficult to adopt
such different methods without compromising many of their foundational assumptions
about the musical form.
14 See Reich, supra note 4, at 8C ("[F]ledgling musicians with small pocketbooks can
pick up a Casio sampler for roughly $125, then start buying and selling black market
sounds."); see, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ('"Thou shalt not steal.").
15 See Zimmerman supra note 5, at 4D. "Producer/rapper Daddy-O says sampling is a
legitimate 'collage,' and compares it to 'appropriationism' in art, in which existing images
are duplicated and used anew by such postmodern artists as Andy Warhol. It's something
you put together out of bits and pieces other people have done. Once you have the
complete product, you have a completely different picture." See also SCHLOSS, supra note
3, at 25. Hip hop producers view deejaying as an essential element in the production
process.
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A. The Beginnings of Hip Hop
Before there was "hip hop" as it has been coined today, there
were disc jockeys. 16 The original disc jockey's creative process
involved searching through milk crates filled with records to find
songs with great percussive sections to dance to, known as "break
beats."17 The process of "digging in the crates" and searching for
the next great beat has become fundamental to the hip hop
tradition.i8 Disc jockeys also began modifying the music they
played using turntables and a stereo mixer.19 In the 1970s, "disc-
jockeys experimented with stretching percussion breaks and
instrumental passages" through manipulation in an attempt to
find something new for their fans.20 "[B]y incorporating the bass
and drum introduction of Chic's popular dance hit 'Good Times'
into their musical mix, disc-jockeys gained instant dance floor
credibility," an attribute vital to their popularity and professional
growth. 21 Eventually, in the late 1970s the isolation of the break,
16 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing the practice of creating hip hop music
by using digital sampling to create sonic collages evolved from the practice of hip hop disc
jockeying). See also Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling-A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 122 (2003) (explaining that the origins of hip hop are traceable to
the innovative disc jockeys or "selectors" in Jamaica in the late 1950's and early 1960's).
17 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 2 (defining beats as "musical collages composed of
brief segments of recorded sound"); see also Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits:
Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 182
(2002) (noting how Bronx-style disc jockeys distinguished themselves from their disco
counterparts).
18 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 92 (explaining that any present-day practice of
digital sampling must always be linked back to the old-school practices of digging in the
milk crates of old records searching for beats); see also Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple:
Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, 11 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 12, 24-25 (2002) (discussing
the fast spreading popularity that disc jockeys enjoyed, particularly after the arrival of
Kool Herc to the South Bronx).
19 See Shimanoff, supra note 18, at 24 ("During the 1960s, Jamaican DJs traveled
around the island nation with portable sound systems, entertaining local communities in
temporary makeshift discos."); see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 182 ('Using two
turntables and a stereo mixer, the DJs would extend and combine the break beats into
new creations").
20 Jeffrey H. Brown, Comment, 'They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To" The
Legal Implications of "Sampling" in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941, 1948
(1992) (illustrating the birth of hip hop music); see also SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 92
(discussing how it was often the goal of these disc jockeys to surprise the audience with
what songs they could get them to dance to); Shimanoff, supra note 18, at 25 (explaining
how disc jockeys would sample and rap over break beats from popular Latin, R&B and
disco music); Wilson supra note 17, at 182 (describing the 1970's Bronx-style disc-jockeys
playing only the most percussive portions of a record, known as the break beat).
21 Brown, supra note 20, at 1948 (discussing the manipulation of hit records as the
core of early disc jockeying); see also Don Snowdon, Sampling: A Creative Tool or License
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along with other effects such as "scratching" and "cutting," were
slowly recognized as musical forms unto themselves, 22 and hip
hop became its own musical genre, rather than simply a style of
musical reproduction. 23
An important force in the shift from hip hop as a fun group
activity to hip hop as a recognized musical form was the eventual
interest shown by the music industry. 24 However, the industry
had difficulty figuring out how to harness this newly-created
genre into a hard medium they could sell, because, although
"playing a popular funk record [at a hip hop show made sense,
playing a popular funk record] on another [record] did not."25 The
problem was soon remedied with the development of a new
technology, the digital sampler. 26 And just like that, these disc
jockeys became producers. 27
With the introduction of the musical instrumental digital
interface (MIDI) synthesizer, these disc jockeys-turned-producers
of hip hop were able to recreate the music they were performing
live in the clubs in a recorded medium. 28 With the digital
sampler, producers were now able to manipulate sounds in many
to Steal?; The Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1989, at 61 (explaining that many early
rap hits were built on the bass line to "Good Times").
22 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 33 (describing the developing recognition of hip hop
as its own musical genre); see also Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital
Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 271, 277 (1996)
(describing "scratching," using a beat box, and fading as techniques which have become
common elements in contemporary rap and hip hop music).
23 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 644 ("Entirely new genres of music have developed
because of the practice of sampling, including hip hop, electronica, and other forms of
dance music."); see also Latham, supra note 16, at 121 (describing the emergence of the
"hip hop" musical genre).
24 See Schloss, supra note 3, at 33 (describing the difficulty in making a hip hop
record before the incursion of the music industry); see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 182
('"The record industry took notice of the rising popularity of the new musical style.").
25 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 34 (stating that the recording industry was faced
with one large "hurdle" prior to sampling's invention).
26 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 2; see also Latham, supra note 16, at 123 (explaining
the introduction of technology into the creation of hip hop).
27 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that DJs who had been using sampling
methods in the clubs were now called "producers" as sampling gained popularity); see also
Wilson, supra note 17, at 182 (noting that "many disc jockeys turned to audio production"
after the introduction of the digital sampler and its ability "to reproduce [their] live
performance onto a recorded medium").
28 See Brodin, supra note 12, at 828 (describing the emerging competition among disc
jockeys in finding new ways to "extract and mix beats"); see also Latham, supra note 16,
at 123 (stating that developing technology now allowed producers to "recreate in the
studio what the D.J.s had been doing by extreme manual dexterity in the clubs.").
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ways, including the ability to play the sound backwards,
shortened, repeated, or "spliced" together with another sound.29
B. Musical Elitism and Criticism of Hip Hop as Art
Most academic literature has attempted to transcribe musical
examples as a way to define or reject hip hop as an art form, and
as a means to determine whether hip hop can really be
characterized as music. 30 Joseph Schloss believes this type of
analysis suggests that there is some kind of debate over what the
word "music" means:
[I]t contains the hidden predicate that music is more
valuable than forms of sonic expression that are not music. If
one believes that only live instruments can create music and
that music is good, then sample-based hip-hop is not good, by
definition . . .. [C]reating an analogous argument about
painting: if you believe that musicians should make their
own sounds, then hip-hop is not music, but by the same
token, if you believe that artists should make their own
paint, then painting is not art. The conclusion, in both cases,
is based on a preexisting and arbitrary assumption.31
Many critics of hip hop presume that sampling is just a lazy
man's music, created with the primary motive of saving money
and time, and that it lacks the artistic creativity found in music
made through traditional instruments. 32 To those in the hip hop
world however, "sampling is not valued because it is convenient,
29 Johnson, supra note 4, at 138 (noting the wide variety of sounds available to a
producer); see Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the American
Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad "Rap"?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 881 (1992) (discussing
samplers' ability to "vary, delete, or reverse certain tonal qualities" once they have
recorded sounds digitally).
30 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 12 (explaining that transcriptions are "descriptive
graphic representations of sound which objectify the results of musical processes in order
to illuminate significant aspects of their nature that could not be presented as clearly
through other means."); see also Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill
Copyright, and Other Problems With Protecting Discrete Musical Elements, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 403, 410 (2006) (stating that transcription of music and "even
direct copying" can lead to different end results from its underlying pieces).
31 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 23.
32 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 76; see Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and
the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660,
1668 (1999) (arguing that sampling "allows a producer of music to save money (by not
hiring a musician) without sacrificing the sound and phrasing of a live musician in the
song.").
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but because it is beautiful."33 An example of the intrinsic benefits
of the sampling aesthetic is the practices of one hip hop producer:
[H]er approach is to hire live musicians, record them in the
studio, and then sample that recording and work with the
resulting samples to create the finished work .... [T]here
is something in the sampling process itself that cannot be
duplicated with live instrumentation: . . . "The reason why
people sample is because you get an instant vibe, and an
instant sound, from that original recording that you can't
get by recording somebody playing a horn .... part of it's
the ambience, part of it's the atmosphere. . just recording
it down straight, it'll just sound too placid; it won't have
any vibe."34
Musicians in other genres often refuse to consider the fact that
hip hop is not "aesthetically deficient, but simply operating from
a different perspective." 35 Sample-based hip hop is by definition
not a "performing" genre, as the hip hop musician's instrument is
the sampler. 36  This fact "totally obliterates conventional
distinctions between performing (or practicing) [music] and
recording [music]."37
In the hip hop community, any evaluation of the aesthetic
quality of the music created is primarily based on how creatively
the producer is able to use the sample, relative to the sample's
original context and form.38 Hip hop producers see finding music
to sample and manipulate as a challenge. Through sampling,
producers are able to take musical performances from a variety
33 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 65. See generally Bergman, supra note 8, at 620-22
(discussing the rave reviews and artistic value credited to DJ Danger Mouse's creation of
The Grey Album which mixed the acapella version of Jay-Z's The Black Album with all
the music from the Beatle's The White Album).
34 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 73-74 (quoting hip hop producer The Angel).
35 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 70.
36 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 46; see Wilson, supra note 17, at 182 (noting that many
disc jockeys turned to audio production after the introduction of the digital sampler and
its ability to reproduce their live performances onto a recorded medium).
37 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 46 (explaining that everything that is done with a
sampler is by definition recorded, the output of which is almost always transferred to a
conventional medium).
38 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 13 (concluding that any kind of traditional musical
analysis simply cannot be utilized when trying to fit hip hop into a preconceived notion as
to what "music" is supposed to be); see, e.g., Bergman, supra note 8, at 624 (demonstrating
the process the creator of The Grey Album had to go through in order to "seamlessly mix"
Jay-Z's vocals from The Black Album with the musical components of The Beatle's The
White Album, making sure the samples "mesh[ed] with the lyrics" from the Beatle's
songs).
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of recorded contexts and organize them into a new relationship
with each other.39 To a hip hop producer, musicians playing
musical instruments can technically play anything they want
using any notes or combination of notes and chords, and are
therefore not "constrained by the nature of a particular musical
performance on a particular old record," like a hip hop
producer. 40 While the ability to start from a blank canvas and
play anything on a traditional instrument might be seen as more
difficult, hip hop producers see it as cheating and taking the
easier road, because there are less limitations and obstacles
blocking the transformation of that blank canvas into a work of
art. 41
C. Hip Hop Terms of Art
Generally speaking, there are four important terms of art
within the hip hop sampling community: biting, flipping,
chopping, and looping.42 "Biting" is a term used throughout the
hip hop world referring to the use of material from other hip hop
artists.43 It is considered a violation of sampling ethics for a hip
hop producer to sample a recording that has already been used
by another producer. This stresses the importance of originality
in the hip hop community and demonstrates that the hip hop
producer's most basic ethic is to be original. "To do the same
thing someone else does is not creative, but taking a new
approach to familiar material is." 44 Sampling from another hip
hop record would also be exploiting that previous effort. 45 Hip
39 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 151; see, e.g., Bergman, supra note 8, at 624-25 (noting
how The Grey Album was created by mixing an album by Jay-Z with one by the Beatles).
40 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 69.
41 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 69 (discussing how hip hop producers see instrumental
freedom); see Bergman, supra note 8, at 646 (noting that sampling cases are generally
brought due to equating sampling with stealing).
42 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 106; see also Matthew S. Garnett, Music: The
Downhill Battle to Copyright Sonic Ideas in Bridgeport Music, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
509, 521 (discussing the different sampling terms in the hip hop community).
43 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 106 (explaining that while it is rare for rap artists to
sue each other over the use of samples, rappers generally do not tolerate the use of their
signature sound or allow their work to be used in an endorsement without compensation);
see also Brown, supra note 20, at 1958 n.92 (stating that rap artists do not mind being
sampled in another's work).
44 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 107.
45 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 114 (noting the ethical restraint within the hip hop
community); see also Garnett, supra note 42, at 515 (citing the Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 114(b) (2005)).
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hop producers also believe that building from another producer's
efforts is not sufficiently challenging, as they are not doing the
proper "digging" for the beat.46 The rule against "biting"
demonstrates the value of hard work and creativity among those
in the hip hop community. 47 An artist who samples from a hip
hop record does not demonstrate either of these qualities because
the record has already been discovered and optimized for its "hip
hop aesthetic."48 This is an interesting example of how the hip
hop community's own set of ethics runs parallel to a common
legal concept, and yet is based on a different set of concerns. 49
"Flipping" refers to creatively and substantially altering
material, the idea being that one adds value through the
creativity of his or her alterations.50 "Chopping" refers to altering
a sampled phrase by dividing it into smaller segments and
reconfiguring the segmented pieces in a different order.51
"Looping" refers to sampling a longer phrase (one or more
measures) and repeating it, often with little or no alteration.52
Looping allows the sample to be completely recast, as the end of
the phrase being looped is juxtaposed with its beginning.53
Through looping, the creator is able to hear things that the
46 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 120 (suggesting an element of pride in proper
"digging'); see also John Schietinger, Note and Comment, Bridgeport Music Inc. U.
Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 215-16 (2005) (noting that not only do hip hop producers want to
produce their own beat, but they are legally obligated to do so due to the Copyright Act of
1976).
47 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 119 (suggesting that biting is the taking of another's
work and is not allowed); see also Schietinger, supra note 46, at 239 (noting that sampling
is not simply a "copy and paste" of a previous recording).
48 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 119; see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 182 n.35
(citing Mtume ya Salaam, The Aesthetics of Rap, 29 African-American Rev. 303 (1995)).
49 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 125. The rap community has their own set of
sanctions outside of the legal system. See also Brown, supra note 20, at 1958 n.92.
Rappers Kool Moe D. and L.L. Cool J have had a long running feud in which they publicly
humiliate one another by using and ridiculing the other rapper's style.
50 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 106; see also Kenneth M. Achenbach, Comment: Grey
Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the
Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
187, 201 (2004) (explaining how a riff can be re-contextualized giving it a dramatic
transformative effect on the way the listener perceives the sound).
51 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 106; see also Achenbach, supra note 50, at 201-02
(discussing the technique of cutting out smaller snippets of sound and then re-sequencing
them in a new key or tempo).
52 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 106; see also Achenbach, supra note 50, at 201-02
(defining looping as sequencing the riff in a repetitive manner to create a rhythm track).
53 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 137; see also Achenbach, supra note 50, at 201-02
(explaining how a riff can be re-contextualized).
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original musician never intended, as the rhythm, melody,
harmony, or timbre changes the entire sensibility within which
this sound is interpreted.5 4
D. The Magnitude of the Hip Hop Genre Within the Music
Industry
Hip hop music has consistently generated significant sales for
record labels, often ensuring that those labels remain
profitable. 55 The Billboard Top 200 Albums for 2005 showed the
top two grossing albums as belonging to hip hop artists. 56 The
very creation of the ringtone craze has been partially attributed
to hip hop music.5 7 Six out of the top ten ringtones on Billboard's
"Hot 100 Ringtones" of 2005 were hip hop songs. 58 Beyond music,
hip hop has shown a huge influence in other markets. 59
"Marketing experts estimate that one-quarter of all discretionary
spending in America... is influenced by hip hop," 60 and its
influence on popular culture has also had a dramatic effect on
international markets, highlighting the potential expansion of
the largely American based hip hop marketing machine on a
global scale. 61 Russell Simmons, the founder and CEO of Phat
54 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 137; see also Achenbach, supra note 50, at 201-02
(explaining how a riff can be re-contextualized, giving it a dramatic transformative effect
on the way the listener perceives the sound).
55 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 204 (demonstrating the prominence of digitized
and sample-based music in the music industry).
56 See The Billboard 200, available at http://www.billboard.com/bbcomyearend2005
/charts/bb200.jsp (last visited March 20, 2007), which lists 50 Cent's "The Massacre" as
number one and Eminem's "The Encore" as number two. In 2006, Eminem also had the
number six album for the year with his compilation album "Curtain Call: The Hits."
57 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 204 n.88 (discussing the ringtone boom); Michael
Cerrati, Article, Video Game Music: Where it Came From, How it is Being Used Today,
and Where it is Heading Tomorrow, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 293, 313 (noting that
ringtones sample songs).
58 See Billboard Hot 100 Ringtones, available at http://www.billboard.bizbbbiz
/yearendcharts/2005/rtntitl.jsp (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (showing that "Candy Shop" by
50 Cent featuring Olivia as number one and "Drop It Like Its Hot" by Snoop Dogg
featuring Pharrell as number two).
59 See Paul Butler, Symposium, Much Respect: Towards a Hip Hop Theory of
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 993-95 (2004) (describing hip hop's influence on the
marketplace, the academy, and politics); see also Azell Murphy Cavaan, MOVIES; HIP HOP
HURRAY; FILMS WITH URBAN FLAVA CROSS OVER AND TAKE Box OFFICE BY STORM, B.
HERALD, Apr. 17, 2003, at 57 (describing how movies about urban culture or starring hip
hop artists consistently produced sales worth hundreds of millions of dollars).
60 Berfield, supra note 2, at 90.
61 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 205 (stating that "[h]ip-hop music and its
influence upon popular culture has had a dramatic effect on national and international
markets, specifically the Japanese market."); see also Yo Takatsuki, JAPAN GROWS ITS
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Fashions and co-founder of Def Jam Records, became the
manager of hip hop group Run-DMC.62 "Without the capital he
drew from sample-based music, Mr. Simmons could not have
established himself in the music industry and built his multi-
million dollar business empire."63
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
In its analysis of digital sampling, this article will next
examine the origins of copyright law, and then break down the
basic principles and provisions that apply to musical works.
A. Origins of Copyright Law
In order to understand United States copyright law, it is
important to look at its origin: Great Britain's Statute of Anne. 64
The United States Copyright Clause came from this 1710 British
statute, which replaced the monopoly that publishers had over
publishing in England for two centuries. 65 The Statute of Anne's
Preamble states the statute is "an act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors ... of such copies." 6 6 The statute goes on to state its
purpose as "the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and
Write useful Books." 67 The Statute of Anne shifted the "focus of
protection ... from the publisher to the author [and] created a
public domain [by requiring that] a new work be created in order
OWN HIP HOP, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3324409.stm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (describing the explosion of hip hop culture in Tokyo, Japan).
62 See Berfield, supra note 2, at 90 (noting that Run-DMC was one of the first of such
groups to achieve significant mainstream success, in large part due to their originally
unlicensed incorporation of an Aerosmith sample into one of their songs); see Paul Butler,
supra note 59, at 994 (recognizing Simmons for his prominence both in the Hip hop
community and the political arena).
63 Achenbach, supra note 50, at 206.
64 See Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.); see also Dawn M. Larsen, Note,
The Effect of the Berne Implementation Act of 1988 on Copyright Protection for
Architectural Structures, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 153 (1990) (' Modern copyright law
traces its roots to the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 1710.").
65 See Jason S. Rooks, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses in
Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 256 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
United States Copyright Clause originated from [the Statute of Anne]"); see also L. Ray
Patterson, Copyright and the "Exclusive Rights" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9-14
(1993).
66 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.), available at
http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html.
67 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19.
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to acquire copyright protection." 68 The Statute also limited the
term of the copyright, which "further strengthened the public
benefit [b]y eliminating the perpetual copyright," and making the
work available to the public upon the expiration of the copyright
term.69 The Statute's goal was to limit the publishers' control
over the publication, thereby ensuring public access to
information.70 The very existence and creation of the statute
clearly demonstrated that no adequate right existed at common
law. 7 1
B. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution
The United States Copyright Clause can be found in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. 72 Through
this Clause, Congress is empowered "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 73 Three purposes are advanced by this clause:
(1) "to promote learning ("Progress of Science and useful Arts"),
(2) to benefit authors (with an "exclusive right"), and (3) to
ensure public access (with protection only for a limited time)".74
"Of these three purposes, two benefit the public and one the
author; and the benefit to the author is a means to the ends of
promoting learning and protecting the public domain."75
Statutory interpretation strongly suggests that the Constitution's
ultimate goal "is the promotion of "Science and the useful Arts,"
68 Rooks, supra note 65, at 256-57 (stating that "the driving force of the Statute of
Anne, then, was to curtail publishers' (Stationers') control over publication, thereby
ensuring public access to information"); see Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19.
69 Rooks, supra note 65, at 256 (stating that the limited term of the copyright further
strengthened the public benefit); see Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., ch. 19.
70 Rooks, supra note 65, at 257 (postulating that the curtailing of publisher's control
was a driving force of the Statute of Anne); see Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., ch. 19.
71 See Rooks, supra note 65, at 257 (stating that the very existence of the statute
showed that no common law right existed); Kristina Rosette, Back to the Future: How
Federal Courts Create a Federal Common-Law Copyright Through Permanent Injunctions
Protecting Future Works, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 337-38 (1994)).
72 U.S.C.A. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73 U.S.C.A. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
74 Rooks, supra note 65, at 257 (stating the three purposes of the United States
Copyright Clause); see L, Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 394-
95 (1992).
75 Rooks, supra note 65, at 257; Patterson, supra note 65, at 24 (discussing the
benefits of the Copyright Law).
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and not simply the protection of a proprietary interest of an
author in his work."76
The Copyright Clause is both a grant of and limitation on
Congress' power to define what copyright law is. 77 As a result of
this provision, Congress can grant copyright owners a "limited
monopoly" over their work. 78 Monopolies tend to have an
undesirable effect on markets and are especially damaging to
those markets that depend on the exchange of ideas for
development. 79 The "monopoly privileges" that Congress can
authorize through the Copyright Clause are not meant to provide
a private benefit to the author.80 "The use of this limited
monopoly [by the author] ... is a means of obtaining the goal of
copyright: to stimulate artistic creativity for public good."81 This
public good is achieved when artists are provided with the
necessary incentive and encouragement to continue making
creative works.8 2
76 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 192 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8).
77 Rooks, supra note 65, at 257 (stating that as a constitutional delegation, the
Copyright clause is both a grant of, and limitation of Congress' power); see United States
v. Martignon, 346 F.Supp.2d 413, 424-25 (2004) (discussing Congressional limits on
power).
78 Mary B. Percifull, Digital Sampling: Creative or Just Plain "CHEEZ-OID?" 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1992) (explaining the constitutional provisions and
policies of copyright); see generally Scott L. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and
Compulsory Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 381-
84 (describing the limited monopoly policy of copyright law).
79 Achenbach, supra note 50, at 192 (discussing the purpose the Constitution's
copyright clause to promote progress and maintain "exclusive interests"); United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1137-38 (1981) (noting the undesirable effect of
monopolies).
80 Rooks, supra note 66, at 258 ("[Mlonopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit."); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that
monopoly privileges are not unlimited or designed to provide a special benefit).
81 Percifull, supra note 78, at 1270 (explaining the limited monopoly grant of
Congress through the constitution); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975), superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (2005) (stating the important
public incentive of copyright law).
82 Percifull, supra note 78, at 1270 (explaining the limited monopoly grant of
Congress through the constitution); see Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156
(stating the important public purpose of copyright law).
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C. Copyright Law is a Creature of Statute; Common law
Principles Do Not Apply
As the Constitution firmly demonstrates, copyright law is a
"creature of statute"83 and "it is Congress that has been assigned
the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should
be granted."84 It is clear through the constitutional grant of
power to Congress that Congress alone can define copyright
infringement remedies.8 5 The courts cannot impose common law
remedies under circumstances that might otherwise seem
appropriate, specifically when copyright owners attempt to raise
common law principles of property rights in copyright disputes
between copyright owners and users.8 6 These types of arguments
raised by copyright owners stem from their belief that the source
of copyright is actually in natural law. 87 While the common law
theory that an author is entitled to the "fruits of his labor" may
govern a work pre-publication, once the work is "published,"
statutory copyright laws preempt any natural law protection. 88
Courts have had a difficult time applying this concept, and
have approached copyright issues from the proprietary, natural
law perspective.8 9 The Supreme Court has taken a "quasi-
property" approach to copyright, which helps further make clear
that copyright is a regulatory concept "because the real subject of
the copyright is not the work, but the use of the work."90 Courts
83 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating "the copyright is the
creature of the federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in the
Congress"); see Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579, 580 (3d Cir. 1941) ("Copyright as
distinguished from literary property is wholly a creature of statute.").
84 Rooks, supra note 65, at 259 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429).
85 See Rooks, supra note 6, at 259; see generally Rosette, supra note 71 (discussing
federal common law and its place in copyright law).
86 See Rooks, supra note 65, at 259 (referring to "copyright owners' attempts to
persuade courts to apply common-law principles of property rights in ... copyright
disputes"); see generally Rosette, supra note 71.
87 See Rooks, supra note 65, at 259-60 (stating that copyright owners would rather
consider copyright laws as a proprietary right of the author); see also Laws v. Sony Music
Ent., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (2006).
88 Rooks, supra note 65, at 260 (explaining how common law protects the proprietary
interest of authors up until the time of publication and then is preempted by statute);
Patterson, supra note 65, at 8-9.
89 Rooks, supra note 65, at 261 (explaining the court's confusion between proprietary
and regulatory concepts of copyright law); see, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video
Monitoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1991) (questioned by Los
Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. Cal. 1992)).
90 Patterson, supra note 74, at 37; see Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 242 (1918) (characterizing the news reports as quasi-property).
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have further difficulty applying the regulatory concept to the
copyright setting because it can result in overreaching by the
courts. 91 "Frequently, the court is presented with a 'good guy'
copyright owner and a 'bad guy' ('pirate') copying. As a result, in
affording relief, the interest of the public in the free flow and
availability of ideas is often overlooked." 92
D. Congress'Power to Define Copyright Law
Through the powers granted in the Constitution, Congress has
created subsequent copyright law, beginning with the Copyright
Act of 1790 to the most recent Copyright Act of 1976.93 Within
each Act Congress has considered the interests of the three main
parties involved: the authors, the disseminators (publishers and
distributors of the works created), and the public users of
copyrighted works;94 however, Congress has repeatedly stated
that the main purpose of the Copyright Act is the public good of
use and access to works of art, 95 even if such a public good comes
at the expense of the author of the work.96 In the Report
concerning the 1909 Copyright Act, the House Judiciary
Committee stated:
91 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1483 (describing the court as allowing an
"aggressive and overreaching copyright owner [to seduce] a court into affording it control
over too broad a territory in which it seeks exclusive dominion"); see The National
Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1089
n.161 (1996) ("[D]iscussing the need to 'assure contributors to the store of knowledge of a
fair return for their labors,' on the one hand, and the need to avoid 'impeding the harvest
of knowledge' available for public use, on the other hand." (quoting Feist Publ'n, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991))).
92 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1483.
93 17 U.S.C. S. § 102(a) (2007).
94 See Patterson, supra note 74, at 388 (explaining the purpose of copyright
regulation); see Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Lmt., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir.
1993) ("Copyright policy is meant to balance protection.., ensure fair return to authors
and inventors and.., establish incentives for development, with dissemination, which
seeks to foster learning, progress and development.").
95 See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
63, 65 (1965) (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights, accompanied
by Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register) (stating that the basic role of copyright is
protection of "public interest"); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)
(declaring that copyright law is "[njot primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public").
96 Randy S. Kravis, Does a Song by any Other Name Still Sound as Sweet?: Digital
Sampling and its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 231, 261 (1993) (stating that
Congress puts the public good ahead of the rights of the author).
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In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider...
two questions ... how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public ... and
how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon
the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary
monopoly. 97
The Supreme Court has interpreted copyright laws as not
holding the interests of these affected parties equally. In
Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken98, the Court held:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to serve a fair return for an "author's"
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. 99
In Fox Film v. DoyaliOO, the Court stated "[t]he sole interest of
the United States and primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."101 In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,102 the
court stated "the purpose of copyright is to create incentives for
creative effort."103 These interpretations reaffirm that copyright
laws exist primarily to serve the public interest, with the
interests of the authors and publishers being secondary.104
97 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
98 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
99 Id. at 156.
100 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
101 Id. at 127.
102 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
103 Id. at 450.
104 See Rooks, supra note 65, at 259 (stating that the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the public interest is primary and the interests of authors and publishers are
secondary); Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 ("The ultimate aim [of
copyright] is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
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E. The Copyright Act of 1976
The 1976 Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression." O5 The Act itself
does not define what is meant by "original," but courts have
determined that the originality threshold is a very low one.10 6 In
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,10 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that an author need only contribute
something more than a "merely trivial" variation, and the work
simply has to be "recognizably his own" for the court to consider
the work at issue to be original.108 An original work must also
possess "independent creation," but it need not be an invention of
striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty; rather, it simply
must be a distinguishable creation of the author.10 9 Section 106
of the Act lists the five exclusive rights of a copyright owner: the
right of reproduction, the right to prepare a derivative work, the
right to distribute the work, the right to perform the work, and
the right to publicly display the work.110 Copyright infringement
occurs when someone exercises one or more of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights without permission from the copyright
owner."11 Congress has not prohibited all copying.112 The House
Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 states that
"infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial
portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
sound recording are reproduced" suggesting that the purpose of
105 17 U.S.C. S. § 102(a).
106 See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 410-11 (2d
Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) (stating that "required creativity for copyright
is modest at best"); Moore v. Lighthouse Publishing Co., 429 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (S.D. Ga.
1977) (holding that the "test of originality is one of low threshold"); Jacobs v. Robitaille,
406 F. Supp. 1145, 1149-50 (D.N.H. 1976) (ruling that only minimal amount of creativity
is necessary to support copyright).
107 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
108 Id. at 490.
109 Id.; see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (holding that copyright protects
originality, not novelty), superseded by statute, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1959); Dorsey v. Old
Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938) (stating that in order to be
copyrighted, the work must be original in that the author has created it by his own skill,
labor, and judgment).
110 See 17 U.S.C.S. § 106.
111 Johnson, supra note 4, at 140-41 (explaining basic copyright protection); see 17
U.S.C.S. § 501(a) (providing that "anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright.").
112 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (holding that similar works can be made without
infringing on copyright); Johnson, supra note 4, at 141 (pointing out that copying of small
samples is permissible).
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the statute was to protect "substantial portions" of a copyrighted
piece, and not the individual notes.113
There are two different types of copyrights within one recorded
song: one for the musical composition, or the underlying words
and music of the song1 4 (what is found on sheet music), and one
for the sound recording, the recorded performance of that musical
work.11 The copyright owner of the underlying musical work
enjoys all five of the exclusive rights; however, the copyright
owner of the sound recording only enjoys the exclusive rights to
reproduce the sound recording, to prepare a derivative work of
the sound recording, and to distribute copies of the sound
recording.116 This suggests that Congress intended less, and not
equal protection for a sound recording copyright holder than for a
copyright holder in the underlying composition.117 The owner of
the musical composition almost never owns the sound
recording. 118
It is important to note that under the Act as it is currently
written, artists are allowed to record a "cover" of a previously
recorded work and to imitate the performance of the original
artist.119 Under the "compulsory license" provision of Section 115,
anyone who follows the procedures set out in the statute and
pays the statutorily stipulated fees can "cover" the original
recording without the express permission of the copyright owner
as long as the new version does not "change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work."120 The statutory fee is set by
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal and revised biennially in direct
proportion to changes in the Consumer Price Index.121 In
113 H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5721.
114 See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a)(2).
115 See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a)(7); 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.
116 See 17 U.S.C.S. § 106; see also 17 U.S.C.S. § 114(a).
117 See 17 U.S.C.S § 114(a) (2007) (limiting the rights of sound recording copyright
owners to less than the full breadth of rights available).
118 Donald S. Passman, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS, 307
(Simon & Schuster 2000) (1991) (discussing dual ownership of recordings and the
limitations created by this system).
119 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2005) ("A compulsory license includes the privilege of
making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved.").
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2005).
121 See 37 C.F.R. § 307.3(f) (1991)( "On November 1, 1991, and each November 1
biennially thereafter until November 1, 1995 ... the Copyright Royalty Tribunal ... shall
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creating this compulsory license, Congress tried to strike a
balance between two of the competing interests of composers and
the public by encouraging and rewarding those composers for
their creative and artistic work, but also maintaining public
access to such works.122 As a result, "the Act both limits the
copyright owner's right to withhold the song from the public and
provides compensation to the copyright owner for the use of the
song."123 The practice of using cover songs has proven to. be
extremely successful for new, lesser-known artists wishing to
attract audiences' attention. 124 Not only does the new artist
receive that attention, but the original composer also benefits
from a renewed awareness of his or her work, often in new
markets where that composer might not otherwise have received
any exposure.125 Without the mechanical license provision, the
practice of covering songs may not have ever had the impact it
does in the industry today, as artists could have refused to
license their composition to any perceived competitors in the
market.126 "It is impossible to say what the state of music would
be today without artists who used established hits to fuel their
entry into the music industry."127 In 1967, Congress actually
considered dismissing the compulsory license provisions from the
Copyright Act, but record industry representatives argued for its
continued existence claiming that it resulted in an "outpouring of
recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
improved quality, and a greater choice."128
publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of the percent change in the Consumer
Price Index.").
122 See Kravis, supra note 96, at 243 (explaining the rationale for compulsory license
process); see also H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1909) (expressing fear that
granting copyright to creators of musical compositions would encourage monopolization of
such compositions).
123 See Kravis, supra note 96, at 243.
124 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2005) (explaining how the act delineates compulsory licenses
in regards to cover songs); Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210 (discussing the use of cover
songs in the music industry under the compulsory mechanical licensing system of Section
115).
125 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210 (noting the benefits of allowing cover songs
in the music industry to all parties involved); Kravis, supra note 96, at 273 (discussing the
policy benefits of covering songs as well as sampling).
126 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210 (comparing refusals of cover songs to
refusals by some artists to license samples today); see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 649-
50 (highlighting the benefits of a compulsory licensing scheme).
127 Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210.
128 Bergman, supra note 8, at 649-50 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Speech at the
Hastings Music Law Summit West (Feb. 25, 2004)).
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
Prior to 1972, nothing in the United States Copyright Law
made it illegal to duplicate a master recording. 129 The Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971 offered the first federal protection
of a "fixed" recorded performance for all recordings fixed on or
after February 15, 1972.130 The protection is limited to protection
against sound recordings "that directly or indirectly recapture
the actual sounds fixed in the recording."131 This limitation
means that there is no protection against simulated recordings
consisting solely of an "independent fixation" of sounds. 132 To
qualify as a copyrightable sound recording, the work must "result
from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds."'133 Therefore, one note, chord, or sound effect alone
cannot be copyrighted; an aggregate of sounds must exist.134
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIGITAL
SAMPLING
A. Current practices in the music industry
Clearing samples is not easy because there is nothing in the
law that requires the copyright holders to give the necessary
permission, which gives record companies and publishers the
power to stop the release of music containing such samples.135
Efforts to set a uniform royalty rate or some kind of industry-
wide agreement governing payments and clearances of samples
have been unsuccessful, so any bargaining done has been on a
129 See Passman, supra note 118, at 309 (discussing "The Age of the 'Lawful
Duplicators"'); Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271 ("Although recording technology has been
around since the late nineteenth century, sound recordings were not entitled to copyright
protection until 1972.").
130 See Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271.
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b); Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271 (discussing the limitations
of the Copyright Act).
132 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b); Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271 (noting that not all
copying is prohibited by the act).
133 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271 (explaining the substantial
portion analysis).
134 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 141 ("Much controversy has arisen over musicians
sampling one or two notes of a work... [b]y implication, one note, chord, or sound effect
alone cannot be copyrighted-rather, an aggregate of sounds must exist."); see also
Percifull, supra note 78, at 1271 (detailing the Copyright Act of 1976).
135 See Passman, supra note 118, at 307; see also RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, 122 (Robert Nirkind & Silvia Warren eds., Billboard
Books 1999) (stating that because of the wide variety of possible sources any one sample
may require multiple consents).
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case-by-case, sample-by-sample basis.136 "A substantial number
of people, including artists, lawyers, copyright holders, and their
various representatives and assistants, must approve any given
sample request-and any one of them can veto it by simply
ignoring, forgetting, or otherwise failing to respond to it."'137
Artists theoretically must obtain sampling licenses for both the
underlying musical composition and the sound recording.138 A
"master license" is a license to sample the sound recording, and is
granted by the owner of the sound recording copyright, usually
the performer or recording company. 139 A "synchronization
license" is a license to sample the underlying musical
composition, and is granted by the owner composition's copyright
holder, usually the songwriter, or by assignment, a music
publisher.140 Synchronization licenses are often necessary in
conjunction with movies, where a song is used as part of a
background for a scene. 141
According to Donald Passman, the author of All You Need to
Know About the Music Industry, "[i]f the usage is minor, and it's
a little-known song, a sampler might be able to buy out all the
rights for a flat fee."'142 The range for these fees will usually be in
the range of $5,000 to $15,000 for the record company, and about
the same for the publisher,143 however if the usage is more
136 See Brown, supra note 20, at 1954 (discussing current practices with regards to
sample clearance); see also Szymanski, supra note 22, at 290 (explaining that the music
industry has taken an ad hoc approach to license negotiations).
137 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 179.
138 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 644-45 (explaining the possible agreements artists
can get in regards to the underlying musical composition); see also Brooke Shultz, Sound
Recordings: "Get a License or Do Not Sample," 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP 327, 329
(2005) (discussing the two distinct copyrights discussed within digital sampling context).
139 See Astride Howell, Sample This! A Ninth Circuit Decision Seems to be in
Harmony with the Sixth Circuit's Bright-Line Rule on What Constitutes Infringement in
Digital Sampling, 28 L.A. LAWYER 24, 25-26 (2005) (explaining the different underlying
works of copyright protection regarding songs); see generally Shultz, supra note 138, at
329 (discussing who usually gives permission on sample clearance).
140 See Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26 (discussing sample clearance procedure);
Shultz, supra note 138, at 329 (discussing who usually gives permission on sample
clearance).
141 See Passman, supra note 118, at 311 (defining synchronization license).
142 See Passman, supra note 118, at 307; see also SCHULENBERG, supra note 135, at
122 (stating that permissions have to be granted, usually for a flat fee, from all of the
owners of the rights in and to the sampled materials before there can be any commercial
exploitation of the recordings using the samples).
143 See Passman, supra note 118, at 307(noting the typical price ranges for buying
samples); U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Royalty Rates: Section 115, the Mechanical
License, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (listing the
copyright royalty rates).
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significant, fees can go up to $50,000.144 Passman further notes
that "[i]f the agreement is not for a flat fee buyout, the record
company may want an advance against a royalty, usually in
pennies and payable on worldwide sales."145 Fees could also be in
the form of a rolling payment, or a flat amount based on a certain
number of sales, for example $5,000 for every 100,000 units
sold. 146 However, even when an artist wishing to sample can get
past all these hurdles, the copyright holder may also limit the
usage of the sample. For example, an artist could direct that the
sample only be used in records and promotional videos, meaning
that that the artist may not get permission to license the song
with the sample in a commercial without paying even more. 147
Many producers feel that copyright infringement cases brought
today are more often about money and power than of preserving
creativity and artists' rights.148 Hip hop artists generally act
under the belief that copyright laws as applied by courts today
are not doing what the judges claim they are doing in their
holdings; that is, protecting the original musician. 149 In reality, it
is usually the record company that receives most of the
144 See Passman, supra note 118, at 307(discussing the freedom copyright owners
have when choosing royalty prices for sampling); see also SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 6
(noting that the growing expense of sample clearance and securing permission from the
owner of a copyrighted recording have caused many major-label hip hop artists to reject
the use of samples, which some producers see as a threat to their aesthetic ideals).
145 See Passman, supra note 118, at 307-08; see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 645
(explaining the possible agreements artists can get in regards to the underlying musical
composition).
146 See Passman, supra note 118, at 308 ('Publishers rarely give a buyout"); see also
Brown, supra note 20, at 1959 (discussing that most owners of the original master
recordings prefer to issue licenses for a flat fee).
147 See Passman, supra note 118, at 308 (stating that if an artist "lifted an entire
melody line ... [the publisher] might take 50% or more; for less significant uses, the
range is 10% to 20%."); see also SCHULENBERG, supra note 135, at 122 (stating that
permission granted may contain other conditions or restrictions).
148 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 177. If publishing companies own musical composition
copyrights and record labels own sound recording copyrights, then they will be bring the
infringement action, and receive damages therefrom. See Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26
(stating that a "musical composition is owned by the songwriter or, by assignment, a
music publisher.").
149 SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 177. Language within infringement-action opinions
suggest that judges reach their decisions based on feelings that the creator of a work must
be compensated for that work and any appropriation without compensation is unjust;
however, the parties before them are the owners of the copyrights, usually parties who
had nothing to do with the work's creation. See Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26 (stating
that an artist seeking to utilize a sample from a song generally must obtain permission
from the copyright holder in the form of a license).
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compensation of a sample clearance.150 Following this same logic,
there is also a concern with the idea of nonmaterial art as a
transferable commodity. 151 If copyright is supposed to be about
protecting the rights of a creative individual, how then can the
moral value of creativity be traded on the open market152 and
"[w]hy should someone pay Michael Jackson for sampling the
Beatles?"15 3
B. Recent Court Decisions - Grand Upright, Newton, and
Bridgeport
On December 16, 1991 the first judicial opinion to address the
issue of digital sampling was announced in Southern District of
New York, the very district the practice was said to have
begun.154 In Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records,
Inc,155 one person owned both the copyright in the underlying
composition and the copyright in the master recording, a
relatively rare phenomenon.156 The copyright owner brought an
infringement action against rapper Biz Markie, who had used
three words and a portion of the music from the master recording
150 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 177 ("Once money and power have been factored
out, may producers will argue, the situation [of increased artistic freedom] becomes much
more relative."); see also Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26 (explaining how publishing
companies and record labels often own the copyrights to works in question).
151 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 177 (explaining that holding music as commodities
is not viable); see also Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26 (discussing that songwriters can
assign all rights to their underlying work to anyone, suggesting that someone's creative
idea can be transferred, and become someone else's.
152 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 177-78 (stating that [m]any producers feel that
copyright law is more often a matter of money and power than of creativity and artists'
rights."); see also Howell, supra note 139, at 25-26 (discussing compulsory licenses to
allow for retention of a license without the express permission from the copyright owner).
153 See SCHLOSS, supra note 3, at 178; see also Robert Hilburn, Beatles Sue Nike Over
Use of Song, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1987, at F1 (stating that Michael Jackson owns the
publishing rights to 'Revolution' and other John Lennon-McCartney songs").
154 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185 (holding that "it is clear that the
defendants knew they were violating the plaintiffs rights as well as the rights of others");
see also Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Litigation in the Limelight,
207 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (1992) (stating that no court had addressed sampling prior to the Grand
Upright decision).
155 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183 (stating that the only issue seems to be
who owns the "copyright to the song 'Along Again (Naturally)' and the master recording
thereof made by Gilbert O'Sullivan").
156 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 163 (stating that unique facts of the Grand Upright
decision limit its holding); see also Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 154, at 1 (stating that
"allegations against a premier rap artist may have opened yet a new chapter in the
continuing saga of sampling litigation").
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of the original song.157 Interestingly enough, Biz Markie's
attorney tried to seek out permission for use of the song from
both the artist and the artist's agent (his brother) by sending a
letter requesting use of the song along with a tape copy of Biz
Markie's recording; but, before the two reached an agreement,
Biz Markie went ahead and released the song anyway.158
Without addressing any defense of fair use issues, the court ruled
that once the plaintiff proved ownership, infringement had
occurred by the simple fact that Biz Markie had sampled the
song. 159 The court used Biz Markie's request for permission
against him, both as proof of infringement and proof of
ownership.160 In response to the defendants' argument that
sampling was such a widespread practice in hip hop music, the
court said that attempts to excuse lawlessness by noting a
common disregard for the law are always destined for abject
failure.161 The issue of why permission was not granted became a
large part of the defendants' cross-examination. The artist
claimed that, although his song had been covered hundreds of
times, every cover version was "faithfully sung" according to the
spirit of his original version, a standard that Biz Markie's version
did not meet. 162 While Biz Markie's counsel vowed to appeal the
decision, two weeks later a settlement was announced for a
substantial cash payment.163
157 Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183. The three words used from the Gilbert
O'Sullivan song were three words from the title, and the music used was the first eight
bars of "Alone Again (Naturally)." See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 154, at 1, 5 for a
discussion of the Grand Upright decision.
158 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183-85 (stating that counsel for Biz Markie
wrote to Terry O'Sullivan, Gilbert O'Sullivan's agent, and enclosed copy of the song that
incorporated the original and sought "terms" for use of song).
159 Id. at 183. The frequently cited opening of the opinion, "[t]hou shalt not steal,"
gives a good indication of the frame of mind the court had.
160 Id. at 184 ("One would not agree to pay to use the material of another unless there
was a valid copyright!").
161 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185 n.2 (stating the argument was "totally
specious ... [Its] mere statement... [was] its own refutation").
162 Falstrom, supra note 8, at 376 (discussing motives behind O'Sullivan's refusal to
grant permission to Biz Markie's sample use): see Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 154. at
15 (stating that the licensor had a "custom and practice of permitting releases of a record
containing sampled material in the absence of formalized, executed licenses or without
the parties having agreed to all the principal licensing terms").
163 See Chuck Philips, Songwriter Wins Large Settlement in Rap Suit, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1992, at F1, F12 (noting that "Biz Markie and Warner Bros. Records have agreed
to pay songwriter Gilbert O'Sullivan a 'substantial' financial payment to resolve the
copyright infringement lawsuit"); see also Ronald Sullivan, Judge Rules Against Rapper
in "Sampling" Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at B2 (noting that when "someone
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The decision failed to support its sweeping conclusions with
any sound legal reasoning and further discouraged samplers
from attempting to obtain clearance before sampling-as such an
attempt might later be used against them as evidence of willful
infringement, an unfortunate "catch-22."164 Licensors typically
require a submission of the piece featuring the sample before
issuing a license; however, this practice requires samplers to
violate copyright law by creating the piece in the first place.165 As
the Southern District of New York handles a substantial
percentage of all copyright and entertainment law cases in the
country, this decision had a strong impact on digital sampling in
the music industry, leaving behind an impression of a per se bar
to unlicensed digital sampling. 66 It became binding authority on
all subsequent cases in the district and controlling authority on a
large percentage of future sampling cases. 167
Soon after this litigation ended, the case of Newton v. Diamond
168 arose. In Newton I, the artist had recorded the original
performance, but then licensed all his rights in the sound
recording to ECM Records for $5,000, making ECM Records the
copyright owner of the sound recording.169 In February of 1992,
the Beastie Boys paid ECM Records a one-time flat fee of $1,000
appropriates a small piece of someone's else's music without permission, it is referred to
as 'sampling"');
164 Kravis, supra note 96, at 270 (stating that the absurd result of the Grand Upright
Music decision "may force artists to abandon sampling altogether and to explore possible
alternatives"); see also Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 154, at 6 (noting that licensors
typically require submission of piece featuring sample before issuing license although this
process requires samplers to violate copyright law by creating piece).
165 See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 154, at 6 (noting that licensors typically
require submission of piece featuring sample before issuing license but this process
requires samplers to violate copyright law).
166 See Kravis, supra note 96, at 265-66 (discussing the impact of Grand Upright on
future sampling litigation matters); see also Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation
and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 923, 955 n. 152 (1985) (stating that New York and California generate large portions
of copyright litigation).
167 See Kravis, supra note 96, at 265 (noting that the "Southern District of New York,
which decided Grand Upright Music, handles a substantial percentage of all copyright
and entertainment law cases in this country").
168 See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that
"[d]efendants' motion for summary judgment granted and plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment denied."), affd by 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming "the district court's
grant of summary judgment").
169 See Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (citing First Amended Complaint ("FAC") P
26, Ex. D); see also Latham, supra note 16, at 127.
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in exchange for the rights to sample the recording. 170 Pursuant to
this license, the Beastie Boys digitally sampled and looped the
opening six seconds of the sound recording, so that the loop
appeared over forty times total throughout their final
recording.171 The Beastie Boys did not obtain a license for the
underlying composition, still in the possession of the artist
Newton.172 Newton alleged that the Beastie Boys were legally
obligated to obtain this separate license from him for their
derivative use of his musical composition.173 The Beastie Boys
argued that even if the sample was protectable, their use of it
was merely de minimis and thus, not actionable.174
Because the artist was not the owner of the sound recording
and the Beastie Boys had properly licensed the sound recording,
the court's decision depended on the resolution of two issues: (1)
Whether the three-note sequence as embodied in the musical
composition, absent the distinctive sound elements created by the
artist's performance techniques, was protectable under copyright
law175 and, (2) if the composed sequence was protectable by
copyright, whether the Beastie Boys' unauthorized use of it
infringed the artist's exclusive rights in the composition.176 The
court determined that even if the three-note segment of the
artist's composition had been found to be protectable, the
doctrine of de minimis use would apply to make the Beastie Boys'
170 See Newton 1, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (noting that it is undisputed that Plaintiff
has no rights to the sound recording of his performance, having licensed it for a fee to
ECM Records, who, in turn, granted Defendants a license to sample it).
171 Id. at 1246 (noting that "Defendants copied a three-note sequence with one
background note, approximately six seconds long, from Choir and looped the passage
throughout their song, Pass the Mic" was stated in the Plaintiffs Statement of
Uncontroverted Facts).
172 Id. at 1260 ("Defendants obtained a license to sample from the sound recording,
leaving the court to inquire only whether the three-note sequence of Plaintiffs musical
composition, devoid of the distinctive sound elements created by his unique performance
techniques, can be protected by copyright law.").
173 Id. at 1247 ("Plaintiff contends the Defendants were required to obtain a separate
license for derivative use of the copyrighted musical composition.").
174 Id. (noting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment argues that the portion
of the musical composition sampled cannot be protected as a matter of law or, in the
alternative, that any misappropriation was de minimis and therefore not actionable).
175 Id. at 1249 ("[T]he court must first determine what elements of Plaintiffs work
are protected by his copyright in the musical composition, as opposed to those protected
by the copyright in the sound recording, and "filter out" the latter."); see Sony Pictures
Ent. v. Fireworks Ent., 156 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1157 (C. D. Cal. 2001) ("[T]he Court must
filter out any parts of the copyrighted work which are not protected.").
176 Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (beginning the discussion of the issue).
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sampling of it non-actionable as a matter of law.177 De minimis
use operates to prevent a finding of substantial similarity, which
is a requirement for actionable copying.178 The court referred to
prior court decisions to explain the de minimis standard:
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.,179 Jean v. Bug Music,
Inc.,180 and Fisher v Dees.181 In Sandoval, in order to establish de
minimis use, "the alleged infringer must demonstrate that the
copying of the protected material is so trivial as to fall below the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity."182 In Jean, the
court stated that substantial similarity would not be found if only
a small, common phrase is copied, unless the copied portion is
especially unique or qualitatively important.18 3 In Fisher, the
court stated that copying is de minimis "if the average audience
would not recognize the misappropriation."184
The Newton I court identified the practice of digital sampling
as involving "fragmented literal similarity." 8 5 Following this
analysis, the court stated that the general approach in analyzing
de minimis use is to consider both quantitative and qualitative
factors, so that even if the amount copied is quantitatively trivial,
the threshold of substantial similarity might still be crossed if
the portion used by the defendant is particularly unique to the
original work.186 The court emphasized that with de minimis use
177 Id. at 1256, 1260 (holding that even if there were copyright protection, the
infringement of it would be de minimis in both the discussion and conclusion sections of
the opinion).
178 See id. at 1256-57 (discussing the doctrine of de minimis use); see also Latham,
supra note 16, at 132 ("[Dje minimis use operates to prevent a finding of substantial
similarity, a requirement for actionable copying").
179 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
180 2002 WL 287786 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
181 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
182 Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217; Newton 1, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (discussing the
threshold of substantial similarity).
183 Jean, 2002 WL 287786 at 7 ("No 'substantial similarity [will] be found if only a
small, common phrase appears in both the accused and complaining songs... unless the
reappearing phrase is especially unique or qualitatively important."'); Newton I, 204 F.
Supp. 2d at 1256-57 (quoting Jean omitting internal quotations).
184 Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434 ("[A] taking is considered de minimis only if it is so
meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation."); Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 ("A taking is de minimis if the average
audience would not recognize the misappropriation.").
185 Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (citing Nimmer on Copyright 13.03 [A][2]); see
Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating a case involving
digital copying "is a case of what Professer Nimmer has termed "fragmented literal
similarity" (citing Nimmer on Copyright 13.03[A] [2])).
186 Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (discussing both prongs of the analysis).
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analysis, what is at issue is whether the average listener might
recognize the plaintiffs musical composition as the underlying
source from a performance of the composition as written (as
opposed to whether the average listener might recognize the
segment as taken from the sound recording). 187 The court
concluded that the artist failed to identify any factors separate
from those attributable to his unique performance that rendered
the three-note sequence qualitatively important, and as a matter
of law, the digital sampling by the Beastie Boys was non-
infringing due to its quantitatively and qualitative trivial
nature. 188
On April 7, 2003, the artist's appeal of the California district
court's decision was argued in the Ninth Circuit, and seven
months later the majority opinion was issued, affirming the
Newton I court's grant of summary judgment to the Beastie Boys,
basing its decision solely on the ground of de minimis use. 189 The
Ninth Circuit began its de minimis use analysis by showing that
a relationship between de minimis use and substantial similarity
centered upon the determination of actionable copying. 190 The
Ninth Circuit relied solely upon a footnote in its 1986 opinion in
Fisher v. Dees191 to establish the standard for de minimis use,
where it stated that a taking is considered de minimis only if it is
so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not
recognize the appropriation. 192 Similar to the district court's
analysis, the Ninth Circuit identified digital sampling as a
problem of fragmented literal similarity and stated that
substantiality is determined by considering the qualitative and
187 Id. at 1258 ("The issue is not whether someone might recognize the snippet as
coming from Plaintiffs sound recording-for which Defendants obtained a license; the
question is whether someone might recognize-from a performance of the notes and
notated vocalization alone-the source as the underlying musical composition.").
188 Id. at 1259 ('"The court concludes that any use by Defendants was de minimis and
cannot form the basis of a copyright infringement action.").
189 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003), amended 388 F.3d 1189
(9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005)
190 Newton III, 388 F.3d at 1192-93 ("For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work
to be actionable, the use must be significant enough to constitute infringement."); Newton
II, 349 F.3d at 594 (continuing in this respect to be good law after amendment).
191 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
192 Newton II, 388 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Fisher, the court stated, "a taking is
considered de minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience
would not recognize its use"); Newton II, 349 F.3d at 594 (using the same language to
define de minimis use).
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quantitative importance of the copied segment in relation to the
plaintiffs work as a whole.193
The most recent line of litigation of digital sampling matters
came in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.194 In 1998,
Dimension Films released the film "I Got the Hook Up," whose
soundtrack included the song "100 Miles and Runnin' by the rap
group Niggaz With Attitude (NWA).195 The song included a
sample from "Get Off Your Ass and Jam" by George Clinton, Jr.
and the Funkadelics.196 In this case, the defendant-sampler
entered into a synchronization license agreement, but did not get
a copyright to sample the digital recording.197 In 2001, Plaintiff
Westbound Records, a distributor and producer of sound
recordings, brought suit against Dimension Films, No Limit
Films, and approximately 800 others.198 The plaintiffs' expert
testified that "a two-second sample from the [three-note] guitar
solo was copied, the pitch was lowered, and the copied piece was
'looped' and extended to 16 beats."199 The sample appeared five
times in the four-and-a-half minute song, each looped sample
lasting approximately seven to eight seconds. 200 The defendant
did not dispute that their song sampled the artist's.201
At trial, No Limit argued that even if a valid copyright did
exist, the use of the sample from "Get Off' was de minimis and
not actionable. 202 The district court determined that based on a
qualitative-quantitative de minimis analysis or the fragmented
literal similarity test, the use of the sample in question did not
193 Newton III, 388 F.3d at 1195 (citing 4 Nimmer on Copyright 13.03 [A][2], at 13-47,
48, n.97); Newton II, 349 F.3d at 596 (arguing the same premise).
194 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005),
amended on reh'g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
195 Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (reciting the undisputed facts for summary
judgment purposes).
196 Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 796 (noting these facts are undisputed).
197 See Passman, supra note 118, at 311 (defining synchronization license).
198 Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 795. Plaintiff Bridgeport Music and Southfield, both
music publishers, along with Westbound Records and Nine Records, both distributors and
producers of sound recordings, brought the suit. Id.
199 Id. at 796.
200 See id. (noting "this sample appears in the sound recording '100 Miles' in five
places; specifically, at 0:49, 1:52, 2:29, 3:20 and 3:46"); see also Bridgeport 1, 230 F. Supp.
2d 830 at 841.
201 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 796 ("There seems to be no dispute either that 'Get
Off was digitally sampled or that the recording '100 Miles' was included on the
soundtrack").
202 See id. at 797 (asserting that the sample was legally insubstantial and thus not
actionable under copyright law).
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rise to a level of infringing use.203 The district court further
stated that the de minimis standard was a "derivation of the
substantial similarity element" and that the key question was
whether the average listener would be able to discern the
original source of the sampled recording from the new work
created. 204 After listening to both George Clinton's and NWA's
work, the court found that no reasonable juror, even one familiar
with George Clinton's music, could have known the original
source without having been told.205 Further, the court found that
the small amount of actual copying, as well as the actual
difference between the songs, supported a finding of no copyright
infringement.206 The court concluded that because musical
borrowing was an essential element of creating new works, and
that "even an aficionado of George Clinton's music might not
readily ascertain that his music has been borrowed, the purposes
of copyright law would not be served by punishing the borrower
for his creative use"207 and granted defendant's motion to dismiss
the sound recording infringement claim. 208
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
unanimously reversed the district court's decision, accepting
Westbound's claim that neither a substantial similarity nor de
minimis analysis were appropriate because No Limit Films did
not dispute that it digitally sampled the sound recording. 209 The
court based its conclusion on its interpretation of the sound
recording copyright holders right as absolute, and felt that a
bright-line rule would benefit other courts in creating a more
203 See id. (concluding the use was de minimis and not actionable).
204 Id. at 797; see Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 840-41. The court held that the de
minimis analysis was based on the substantial similarity element. It stated that a
common substantial similarity test is "whether an average lay observer would recognize
the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work." Id. at 840
(quoting Tuff'N' Rumble Management v. Profile Records, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186).
205 Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 798 (finding reasonable user could not recognize "Get
Off' sample unless informed).
206 See Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42 (determining that each looped
segment lasted seven or eight seconds, and that at most 40 seconds of the total four and a
half minute length of "Get Off' are used in the sample).
207 Id. at 842.
208 See id. at 842-43 (dismissing Westbound's sound recording infringement claim).
209 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 798 ("The heart of Westbound's arguments is the
claim that no substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should be undertaken at all
when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally sampled a copyrighted sound
recording. We agree and accordingly must reverse the grant of summary judgment.").
[Vol. 22:1
DIGITAL SAMPLING
efficient marketplace for copyright clearance. 210 The court found
that a "license or do not sample" standard would create easy
enforcement and help promote a self-regulating market for
sampling clearance licenses. 211 Additionally, the court contended
that the rule would not stifle creativity, as artists wishing to use
a section of an existing recording could simply recreate the
desired piece of music in the studio, instead of sampling the
original, if they so desired.212 Positing that the sound recording
owner could not exact a license fee greater than the actual cost of
recreating the sounds, the court felt its holding would assist in
setting the boundaries upon which the fees exacted by the sound
recording owners could be set.213 The court concluded that no
matter how small, even taking three notes of a sound recording
took something of value from the copyright owner, and an inquiry
into how much of, or the intent behind, the sampling was
irrelevant. 214 The court further stated that in regards to the
sound recording copyright, the value was not in the notes, but in
the sounds fixed in the recording, and therefore any taking
directly from the sound recording was not intellectual, but rather
a physical misappropriation. 215
The Bridgeport analysis is flawed in several respects. The
court suggested that fair use analysis would only be reserved
when the sampling artist has obtained a sound recording
copyright and has no license to the underlying music, so that in
the instance where the sampler does not have a sound recording
copyright, infringement will be found.2 16 However, Section 114
210 See id. ("[T]he courts, are best served if something approximating a bright-line
test can be established."); see also id. at 801("[A] sound recording owner has the exclusive
right to 'sample' his own recording.").
211 See id. at 801-02 (stating the need for bright-line rule).
212 See id. at 801 (noting artists' ability to recreate sounds).
213 See id. (suggesting that copyright owners cannot set a fee greater than what it
would cost the person seeking the license to just duplicate the sample in the course of
making the new recording).
214 See id. at 801-02 ("[E]ven when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the
part taken is something of value.").
215 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 802 (analogizing digital sampling with physical
taking); but see Rooks, supra note 65, at 261 (explaining that courts tend to use property-
law principles in deciding conflicts between copyright owner and copyright user and that
this is incorrect because copyright law is statutory and preempts conflicting common law
principles).
216 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 801 n.10 ("[Digital sampling of a copyrighted sound
recording must typically be licensed to avoid an infringement" (quoting Latham, supra
note 16, at 125 (2003))).
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seems to stipulate that the sound recording copyright owner is
"limited" in sampling the actual fixed copy of the work.217
Therefore, this section does not operate as a stronger or
additional right to the copyright owner, but rather as a limitation
upon the more general provisions of Section 106, which include
the substantial similarity test in proving infringement. 218 The
legislative history of Section 114 also suggests that Congress
intended the substantial similarity test to be included when
analyzing sound recording copyright infringement. 219
The court's likening of digital sampling to an actual physical
taking is also faulty in two respects.220 First, it is applying a
common law concept of misappropriation to an area that has
been pre-empted by congressional statute,221 and second, it
misconstrues the nature of sampling.222 "Digital sampling is the
creation of a copy, not the seizure of the original sound."223
Digital sampling leaves the original sound recording intact, so
217 See id. at 800 ("Section 114(b) provides that "the exclusive right of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to
prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality." Further, the rights of
sound recording copyright holders under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 "do not extend
to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those
in the copyrighted sound recording." (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphasis added))).
218 See Steven D. Kim, Taking De Minimis Out of the Mix. The Sixth Circuit
Threatens to Pull the Plug on Digital Sampling in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103, 124 (2006) (critiquing the Sixth Circuit's
statutory analysis); see also Recent Case: Copyright Law-Sound Recording Act-Sixth
Circuit Rejects De Minimis Defense to the Infringement of a Sound Recording
Copyright.-Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), 118
HARV. L. REV. 1355, 1359 (2005) ("[Nlothing in the statute's history or language requires
that a substantial-similarity inquiry not apply to a sound recording copyright.").
219 See Kim, supra note 218, at 124 (criticizing the court's interpretation of the
statutory language of Section 114 as well as the legislative history); see also Recent Case,
supra note 218, at 1359-60 (stating that the Sixth Circuit did not consider legislative
history of Section 114 in their analysis).
220 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 802 (proposing sampling is a physical taking and
not an intellectual one).
221 See Rooks, supra note 65, at 259 (referring to copyright owners' attempts to
persuade courts to apply common-law principles of property rights in copyright disputes);
see generally Rosette, supra note 72 (discussing federal common law and its place in
copyright law).
222 See Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Appellee at 10, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-6521); see also Kim, supra note
219, at 125 (discussing how the court misconstrued the nature of sampling in their
analysis).
223 Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Appellee at 10, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-6521).
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categorizing digital sampling as a physical taking does not make
sense, or allow for any kind of argument that sound recordings
should deserve greater copyright protection. 224
Lastly, the court is mistaken in believing that market
equilibrium can be reached through this decision.225 The court
believed its holding would assist in setting the boundaries upon
which the fees exacted by the sound recording owners could be
set, as it assumed the sound recording owner could not exact a
license fee greater than the actual cost of recreating the
sounds.226 Drawing this conclusion, the court misses the point of
sampling completely, and the value to the sampler of the "unique
nature of the original recorded sounds and the creative choices
that were made in the actual fixation of the composition."227 "It is
the actual embodied performance that contains the value, not the
configuration of a particular combination of notes."22 8 Further,
the assumption that the court's holding will somehow facilitate
the creation of a sampling license market, without something
more, also ignores the reality of the current sampling market's
failure. 229 The copyright owner is in a unique position of power,
and will be able to set a fee much higher than the cost of
recreating the sounds in the studio, because as suggested above,
the value to the sampler of the original recording is much
greater. 230 This all assumes that the copyright owner is even
224 See id. at 10 (proposing that a distinction between physical and intellectual taking
is not meaningful and does not distinguish copying of sound recordings from other types
of copying); see also Kim, supra note 218, at 125 (discussing the misunderstanding of the
court as to the nature of digital samples).
225 See Bridgeport II, 410 F.3d at 801(concluding recording industry and recording
artists possess ability to create meaningful guidelines for licensing).
226 Id. (suggesting that copyright owners cannot set a fee greater than what it would
cost the person seeking the license to just duplicate the sample in the course of making
the new recording).
227 Kim, supra note 218, at 126 (discussing the flaws in the court's market
equilibrium conclusion).
228 Newton, 349 F.3d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the importance of original
performance); see also Kim, supra note 218, at 126 (discussing the value in the original
work to the sampler).
229 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 199 (critiquing Sixth Circuit's failure to
acknowledge unequal bargaining power); see also Kim, supra note 218, at 125-26
(critiquing Sixth Circuit's belief that the per se infringement holding will lead to market
equilibrium).
230 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 200 (claiming that the bargaining process for
copyrights places a potentially deterring financial burden on the sampler); Kim, supra
note 218, at 125-26 (remarking on the court's failure to realize that an artist often seeks
to harness the uniqueness of the sound he samples, not just the compilation of sound).
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willing to license the copyright in the first place, which is not a
guarantee.231
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
A. Case Recap
Before considering possible solutions to the digital sampling
issue, it helps to summarize what the major digital sampling
cases stand for, based on their individual (and unique) set of
facts. In Grand Upright, one person owned both the copyright in
the underlying composition and the copyright in the master
recording, permission was sought by Biz Markie and not
received, and the final court ruling was in favor of the original
artist.232 In Newton, the Beastie Boys paid for the rights to
sample the sound recording but did not obtain a license for the
underlying musical composition from the original recording
artist, but still won the case under the substantial similarity and
de minimis tests.233 In Bridgeport, the defendant-sampler had
entered into a license agreement for the musical composition
copyright but did not get a copyright to sample the digital sound
recording, and eventually lost against the company owning the
sound recording copyright under the theory that any sampling of
a sound recording is per se infringement. 234
231 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 200 (criticizing the court's holding requiring
artists to seek permission from both copyright holders as unduly prohibitive); Kim, supra
note 218, at 126-27 (noting that some copyright holders will be unwilling to allow their
recordings to be sampled).
232 See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183-84; see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 163
(stating that the unique facts of the Grand Upright decision limit its holding); Sugarman
& Salvo, supra note 154, at 1 (restating the facts of the case and the grounds upon which
the court based its decisions).
233 See Newton II, 349 F.3d at 596-98.
234 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (stating the artists must get a license or simply not
sample the piece).
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B. New Legislation - Creating a Subgenre of Fair Use in the
Digital Sampling Context
Copyright itself is a regulatory concept, and the real subject of
the copyright is not the work, but the use of the work.235
Therefore, common law principles of property rights have no
place in copyright disputes. 236 It should follow from this that
there is no reason for the application of the fair use doctrine to
depend on whether the copyright infringement issue is one of a
lack of sound recording copyright or lack of copyright in
underlying musical composition. 237 If a sample is altered to the
point that the underlying work is no longer recognizable, then
the sampled artist is not injured.238 Congress should thus
"embrace a subgenre of fair use analysis that would allow for
determining to what extent a particular sampling constitutes
infringement." 239 Under such a provision, the court would only
have to determine whether a work contained a sample. If indeed
the work contained a sample, the court would then consider the
purpose and character of the use, the amount and substantiality
of the portion used, and the effect on the potential markets. 240 A
major flaw with such a system is that it could lead to potential
over-saturation in the marketplace of certain samples if
prospective samplers were able to sample the same sources at the
same time. 241 However, this concern fails to consider the fact that
artists will doubtfully want to be releasing songs with the same
235 Patterson, supra note 74, at 29-30 (discussing the separation principle); see Int'l
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918) (characterizing the news reports
as quasi-property).
236 Rooks, supra note 65, at 259 (referring to copyright owners' attempts to persuade
courts to apply common-law principles of property rights in copyright disputes); see
generally Rosette, supra note 71 (discussing federal common law and its place in copyright
law).
237 See generally Szymanski, supra note 22 at 312 (discussing the fair use defense
generally as a judicial mechanism for immunizing defendants from copyright
infringement when its use is deemed socially desirable); Patterson, supra note 74, at 29-
30 (explaining, generally, the separation principle).
238 See Shultz, supra note 138, at 334 (2005) (discussing the analysis of Sixth Circuit
in Bridgeport decision); see also John Gerome, Court Says Any Sampling May Violate
Copyright Law, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004-09-08-sampling-
ruling-x.htm.
239 Bergman, supra note 8, at 648 (suggesting the factors that a court should consider
when determining if a piece has been sampled).
240 Falstrom, supra note 8, at 380; see Bergman, supra note 8, at 648 (discussing how
fair use could be applied to the digital sampling context).
241 See Szymanski, supra note 22, at 321-22; see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 648
(discussing the possible drawbacks of allowing fair use in all digital sampling contexts).
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samples as other artists already have (as the public would likely
not want to listen to and thus would not pay to hear such songs),
and thus may be an unnecessary concern. 242 Another concern
with such a subgenre of fair use analysis is what happens when
the sample is not deemed a fair use. At this point, the sampling
artist would be back at square one and would have to only hope
that the sampled artist would agree to some kind of licensing
arrangement, and that such an arrangement would be fair and
set at a reasonable rate.243 This brings us back to the issues of
bargaining power, and the ability for the sampling artist to
contact and communicate with the appropriate copyright owner
in order to obtain permission to use the sample, a practice that
has been proven difficult as demonstrated by the cases
mentioned above.2 44
C. Compulsory Licensing System
Another possible answer to the digital sampling inquiry is
creating a compulsory licensing system (alongside the pre-
existing system for cover songs). 245 Section 115 of the Copyright
Act is the mechanical licensing provision already in place that
allows for the creation of cover songs. 246 The compulsory
licensing scheme ensures that once the copyright owner licenses
out his or her work to be covered by another, the copyright owner
is compelled to license that work to others. 247 The activities
242 See generally Szymanski, supra note 22, at 321-22 (describing how sampling may
over-saturate the market with a particular artist's music); Johnson, supra note 4, at 135-
38 (describing the unique method by which artists use "samples").
243 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 199 (explaining how the court's decision which
requires artists to obtain permission from all copyright holders could lead to exploitive or
unequal bargaining power and refusal to license by any one of the copyright holders
would proscribe the artist from sampling the work); Shultz, supra note 138, at 335 (noting
generally that artists who have not yet experienced financial success may not be able to
afford the restrictive licensing fees).
244 See e.g., Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183-85 (stating the defendant's inability
to obtain a license to use the copyrighted material); Achenbach, supra note 50 at 199
(noting generally the obstacles associated with obtaining permission to use copyrighted
material).
245 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 206 (suggesting that the Copyright Act could be
altered to encompass sampling); Bergman, supra note 8, at 649 (noting that the most
popularly proposed solution for the sampling dilemma is the statutory licensing scheme).
246 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2007); see Falstrom, supra note 8, at 381 n.94 (observing that
cover songs are covered by 17 U.S.C. § 115).
247 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2007) (stating that an artist can obtain a compulsory license for
any song as long as he does not change the "basic melody or fundamental character" of the
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involved in covering a song that are "protected through this
section, share a structural and methodological similarity to the
process of sampling."248 To cover a song, all an artist has to do is
go into the studio with his or her own musicians, and play from
another artist's original written composition, eventually making
a separate recorded piece, with the idea that that new artist will
attempt to emulate the sound of the original recording as closely
as possible. 249 Sampling is much the same, except that it is
technology that enables the sampling artist to reinterpret the
work, without having to "filter his reinterpretation" through
hired studio musicians. 250 Because the fundamental principles
behind the compulsory license of Section 115 already in affect are
similarly applicable to the area of digital sampling, it is clear
that some kind of modification to this statute might be just the
legislation needed to assist artists in the digital sampling
area.251 The compulsory licensing scheme under Section 115
resulted in "an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
being given lower prices, improved quality and a greater choice,"
suggesting that newer forms of creating music, such as sampling,
would also benefit from uniform rates and schemes such as those
under Section 115, creating more compositions for the public in
the process. 252
There are drawbacks in creating a compulsory licensing
scheme for samples as well, the most obvious being that
qualitative value of one sample compared to another vary
drastically, and any kind of multi-tiered payment structure could
result in seemingly arbitrary rates being set, perhaps no
original); see Achenbach, supra note 50, at 208 (commenting on the benefits of a
compulsory licensing system).
248 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210 (discussing the mechanical licensing
provision and how it relates in the digital sampling context).
249 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 210 (discussing the practice of covering songs);
see Falstrom, supra note 8, at 381 n.94 (explaining what it means to "cover" a song).
250 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 211 (comparing covering a song to digital
sampling); Kim supra note 230, at 103 (defining digital sampling).
251 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2007) (delineating the copyright rules for "cover" songs); see
also Achenbach, supra note 50, at 212 (explaining how, given the similarity between
sampling and recording, section 115 of the Copyright act might be the most effective way
of resolving the current conflict).
252 See Bergman, supra note 8, at 649-50 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Speech
at the Hastings Music Law Summit West (Feb. 25, 2004)).
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different than the ones currently set by the music industry. 253
Two possible solutions to this would be to set either a flat fee, or
provide for a particular cost-per-second. Any sort of flat fee
provision would also have to provide for a maximum length of
sample to prevent inequities that could otherwise occur when
very large and very small samples have the same price. 254
Another issue with a compulsory licensing scheme is that it does
not take into account the importance of the sampled artist and
success of the sampled song in determining the true market
value of the end work, something only private negotiations can
truly decipher. 255
D. Combination Fair Use and Compulsory Licensing Scheme
Given the concerns with both the fair use analysis and
compulsory licensing of samplings, what the courts, Congress,
and the music industry should do is apply a combination
compulsory licensing and fair use scheme in the context of digital
sampling. The compulsory licensing scheme is the most obvious
answer to the legal issues involved in digital sampling, but the
major unknown is how the fees should be set so that sampled
artists are compensated fairly and they retain some sort of
control in assuring that their music is not over-saturated in the
market through other artist's works.256 An artist who wishes to
253 See Szymanski, supra note 22, at 295 (noting the possible drawbacks to a
compulsory licensing scheme for samples); see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 650
(discussing the problem with setting rates in a compulsory licensing system).
254 See Achenbach, supra note 50, at 218 (stating that a flat rate should be charged
for digital samples, and that "limiting the duration of a sample would prevent any gross
inconsistencies in the cost per second of a particular sample"); see also Lucille M. Ponte,
Article, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement Cases Are
Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need For Statutory Reform,
43 AM. Bus. L.J. 515, 555 (2006) (noting that under the modified fair use system a
provision limiting the length of the digital sample could alleviate concerns about excessive
copying).
255 See Szymanski, supra note 22, at 295-96 (stating that copyright law itself does not
distinguish between copying major and minor talents and in turn compulsory licensing
would not as well); see also Bergman, supra note 8, at 650 (discussing the possible
drawbacks to a compulsory licensing scheme in the digital sampling context).
256 See Peter K. Yu, Article, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 653, 711 (2005) (noting that copyright owners and critics fear that a compulsory
licensing scheme would convert private copying into a serious threat to copyright revenue
and would limit the ability of copyright owners to price discriminate and otherwise price
their own works); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying and The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV.
813, 857-58 (2001) (stating that copyright owners worry that compulsory licensing levies
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sample a work should have to pay a small fee (on a cost-per-
second basis) to obtain "temporary" rights to create an original
work that includes the sample. The completed piece (inclusive of
the sample) would then be submitted to the proper authority to
determine whether further fees should be exacted, based on a
"fair use fee" analysis, keeping in mind that this analysis is not
for determining whether or not the sampling artist can use the
sample, but how much it will cost him or her to use the
sample. 257 Specifically, the two factors that should be considered
are the "amount and substantiality of the portion used" and the
"effect on the market or value of the copyrighted work."258
As to the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
although the sampled artist would have paid a small, per-second
fee for the initial "temporary" use of the sample, once the
recording has been worked into the final, new composition, a lot
of changes could have been made which require further
assessment. This analysis concerns the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole.259 Because of this, the factors that would need
to be considered in determining the final fee required would
include the length of the sample actually used in the new work,
the number of times it is repeated, or looped, and its prominence
in the song (whether it is in the foreground or background). 260 A
will be inadequate to compensate them for infringement if private copying become
widespread).
257 See Ponte, supra note 254, at 550-51 (noting that accounting for what percentage
of a work has been sampled is crucial to a fair royalty system and that an automated
system, as opposed to a system in which samples are evaluated on a case by case basis,
would not be advisable); see also John Lindenbaum, Music Sampling and Copyright Law
94 (Apr. 8, 1999) (undergraduate thesis, Princeton University Center for Arts and
Cultural Policy Studies) available at http://www.princeton.edu/-artspol/Studentpap
/undergrad%20thesisl%20JLind.pdf (advocating for the creation of an independent
clearinghouse to determine the percentages of ownership in all songs which contain
samples).
258 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (laying out the actual fair use factors from which
this proposed legislation is based upon); Percifull, supra note 78, at 1279-81 (describing
how the fair use factors from 17 U.S.C. § 107 are applied on the context of digital
sampling).
259 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating the actual fair use factors); Percifull, supra
note 78, at 1279-81 (discussing the use of the fair use factors).
260 See Note, A New Spin On Music Sampling: A Case For Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 726, 741 (1992) (reasoning that samples used in the foreground to form a hook or
chorus must be distinguished from a sample used only in the background of a new song);
Lindenbaum, supra note 257, at 97-98 (noting that important factors to be considered in
evaluating the royalties owed to an artist whose work has been sampled include the
importance of the sample in the new work and the length of the sample); Ponte, supra
note 254, at 530, 537-38 (stating that the exploitive nature of looping samples makes the
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new composition whose main chorus or title is based on the
sample (like the sample used in Grand Upright) would be
required to pay a fee greater than an artist who altered the
sample greatly and used it only as a background sound effect (as
was the case in Bridgeport).261
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, would be the analysis
of the effect on the market and the value of the copyrighted work
from which the sample was taken.262 Under the traditional fair
use doctrine, the inquiry made under this factor was "whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by
the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market for or value of the plaintiffs present
work."263 The court's task has been to balance the interests of the
plaintiff and defendant to determine whether the use of the
protected material was fair.264 Again, in the context of a new
compulsory licensing provision, this analysis would be done to
determine the "fair use fee" assessed to the sampling artist, and
not to determine whether or not there has been infringement. 265
Under the "effect on the market" analysis, if the sampling artist
has completely altered the sample, to the point that it is
original sample both qualitatively and quantitatively significant in the new song and that
looping must be considered, because when it is not "an artist may record an entire
compact disc worth of de minimis samples and then loop the de minimis samples so that
they become quantitatively paramount in the infringed work").
261 See A New Spin, supra note 260, at 741 (stating that a sample that forms the
basis of a melody or a chorus that is used repetitively in a new song will generate more
royalties for the original artist than a sample used only once for minor background
support); Lindenbaum, supra note 257, at 98 (noting that sampling several notes to
formulate the entire melody of a song would entitle the original artist to more royalties
than sampling of a single noise meshed among numerous other sounds).
262 See Nicholas B. Lewis, Note, Shades of Grey: Can The Copyright Fair Use Defense
Adapt to New Re-Contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 267, 273
(2005) (stating that Justice Story, in crafting the fair use doctrine, suggested that the
degree in which the use of a sample may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work may affect a court's judgment as to whether
the original work was infringed or not); see also Ponte, supra note 254, at 548 (noting that
an alternative method of determining fees could be based upon a percentage of sample use
in relation to the percentage of materials sampled nationally).
263 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 [A], at 79
(2005).
264 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating the actual fair use factors); Percifull, supra
note 78, at 1279-82 (explaining how the fair use factors from 17 U.S.C. § 107 are applied
on the context of digital sampling).
265 See Ponte, supra note 254, at 550-51 (highlighting the importance of accounting
for what percentage of a recording has been sampled is crucial to a fair royalty system);
see also Lindenbaum, supra note 257, at 98 (taking the position that an independent
clearinghouse with the authority to determine the percentages of ownership in all songs
which contain samples would promote consistency).
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unrecognizable, no further analysis would be required and no
further fee necessary (beyond that assessed under the "amount
and substantiality" factor). 266 The amount of times a particular
artist's work had been sampled would be considered under this
analysis as well. This would address the concerns of over-
saturation and consequential depreciation of the value of the
original work. The more times a particular song had been
sampled, the more it would cost-per-second to sample from that
song for every later artist wishing to sample. The stature of the
sampling artist would also be considered, by taking into account
the possible resulting popularity of the new work containing the
sample based on such factors of the sampling artists' present
exposure on the sales charts and by radio airplay. While it might
seem unfair to charge a more popular artist more per second for
the same sample, release of the more popular artist's works
would be more likely to bring greater exposure to the sampled
work, and more likely to reap larger benefits from using the
sample, and should have to pay incrementally more based on
their established reputation and resources.
After this analysis is completed, and a final fee for use of the
sample is assessed, the sampling artist would be required to pay
that final fee in order to obtain the official license to use the
sample in the song created. This proposed licensing scheme
would require setting up the "proper authority" to carry it out.
The best place for this type of regulation to begin would be within
the music industry, as they know better than any other authority
how their industry should be run.267  Taking away the
"discretionary" nature of permission to sample might make
evaluating fees for samples easier. Determining the exact initial
cost-per-second and then how much each of those factors is worth
266 See Lewis, supra note 262, at 275 (noting that the degree to which a sample has
been "transformed" affects a Court's analysis of whether the use of such a sample
constitutes infringement); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994) (stating that "the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works," and that "the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use").
267 But see Lindenbaum, supra note 257, at 96-97 (noting that a central clearinghouse
agency designed to control digital sampling should not be left in the hands of individuals
from the music industry alone in order to avoid potential corruption).
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in the overall final fee assessment is something best left to those
who work in the industry.268
CONCLUSION
Copyright protection, as stated in the Constitution, was
created to promote artistic creativity and innovation that will be
beneficial to the public. 269 Any private benefit that creators of
musical works receive is incidental to the purpose of maximizing
public benefit from the arts. The reason that copyright owners
are given rights at all in their sound recordings is so that they
are encouraged to create new works.270 It seems highly unlikely
that an artist will decide not to create new music because a few
seconds of their sound recording may be copied and altered into a
new altered sound, and incorporated into a new work very
different from the original.
While the creation of a fuller marketplace for licenses ideally
may have a positive effect on new forms of music containing
samples, such a marketplace does not currently exist. Currently,
the ability of transformative, sample-based music to be released
to the public resides in the hands of copyright holders, often not
the creators of the work themselves. 271 Without any kind of
compulsory licensing scheme, these copyright holders are given
enormous bargaining power, power that is often abused,
resulting in certain creative works never reaching the public.272
268 But see Lindenbaum, supra note 257, at 96-97 (arguing that a central
clearinghouse agency should not be left in the hands of the music industry in order to
avoid corruption).
269 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power... to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
270 See Lewis, supra note 262, at 268 (finding that part of the goal of copyright
protection is to provide incentives for authors to create new works of art, literature,
music); see also A New Spin, supra note 260, at 731 (noting that the rationale underlying
copyright protection reflects efficiency because "the overall output of creative works would
decrease without some measure of protection for creative works").
271 See Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Article, Beyond Napster:
Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 451, 467 (2002) (stating that record companies own copyright in a vast majority
of sound recordings); Percifull, supra at note 78, at 1273 (noting that "in many situations,
the record company will be the sole owner of the copyright interest").
272 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Article, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 215, 294 (1996)
(noting that the inability of users to use and act upon copyrighted works, along with their
absolute dependency on licensing by the copyright owner is dangerous because the
copyright owner has the power to deny the license completely); but see Percifull, supra
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Because any copyright legislation should take into account both
the artists' interest as well as that of the public, an effective
result can be reached through the use of a multi-tiered licensing
scheme that takes into account factors created under the fair use
doctrine already in place. The current lack of compulsory
licensing in the sampling context reduces the pool of sounds
available to create new, original works, ultimately working
against the purpose of the Copyright Act, and in turn, the
Constitution.
note 78, at 1273 n.86 (stating that a few record companies control the vast majority of the
music industry, and as such, sampling infringement cases will seldom be brought either
because a record company sampled from its own recordings or because the person who
claims the infringement is unable to bring suit because he has sampled before and
therefore is barred by the clean hands doctrine).
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